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WHEN “ONE STEP” IS A LEAP: 
EXAMINING THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S 
CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE 
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
Brooke Vaydik* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Eaden, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit interpreted an application note of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the 
Guidelines) narrowly, holding that the presence of ammunition without a gun 
during a drug arrest should not enhance a federal defendant’s sentence.1 The 
court interpreted a Guideline that enhanced a sentence “if the defendant . . . used 
or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony 
offense.”2 The application note to the Guideline clarified that a presumption 
exists that a firearm is used in connection with an offense when the “firearm is 
found in close proximity to drugs,” but does not mention ammunition at all.3 
Because the defendant possessed ammunition without a gun, the court had to 
determine whether the Guideline presumed a connection with an offense when 
only ammunition is present.4 The Fifth Circuit held that ammunition alone was 
not enough to give rise to such a presumption5 and split with a prior holding from 
the Sixth Circuit, where the court held that the presence of ammunition alone 
brought a criminal “one step closer” to having a gun and thus gave rise to a 
presumption that weapons were being used in furtherance of the crime.6 This 
Case Note examines the Fifth Circuit’s correct holding against the background of 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2021; B.A., Boston University, 2011. Thank 
you to my father and mother, Greg and Tammy Vaydik, and my sister, Bryn Vaydik, for all of their 
love and support. 
 1. United States v. Eaden, 914 F.3d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 2. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 3. Id. § 2K2.1 cmt. 14(B). 
 4. Eaden, 914 F.3d at 1007. 
 5. Id. at 1010. 
 6. United States v. Coleman, 627 F.3d 205, 213 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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the development of the Guidelines and discusses the importance of interpreting 
the Guidelines narrowly in light of the outcomes of sentencing reform. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), a comprehensive 
legislative overhaul of the determination of sentencing for federal crimes.7 In 
addition to controlling crime,8 Congress’s goal in passing the SRA was the 
“elimination of disparity [in federal sentences] through adoption of a uniform 
sentencing philosophy.”9 Before the SRA was passed, federal sentencing was 
greatly disparate, with defendants sometimes receiving vastly different sentences 
for the same crime, often along racial and economic lines.10 As a response, the 
SRA created the Federal Sentencing Commission (the Commission), an 
independent agency within the judicial branch made up of seven appointed 
members, at least three of which were required to be federal judges.11 The 
Commission would be responsible for the drafting and establishment of uniform 
sentencing policies for the federal system, including “determinate sentencing 
guidelines.”12 
The Commission promulgated the first Guidelines in 1987, noting that they 
were “but the first step in an evolutionary process” and “a practical effort toward 
the achievement of a more honest, uniform, equitable, and therefore effective, 
sentencing system.”13 In order to constrain the judicial discretion that had led to 
“unwarranted disparity in the pre-Guidelines era,” the Guidelines developed by 
the Commission were binding upon federal judges when determining a 
defendant’s sentence.14 In Mistretta v. United States, the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Commission, holding that Congress 
did not abuse its delegation powers by establishing the Commission and charging 
it with creating the Guidelines because Congress was specific and narrowly 
tailored in its delegation.15 In a scathing and famous dissent, Justice Antonin 
Scalia argued that there was “no place within [the] constitutional system” for an 
agency other than Congress to create legally binding rules.16 Nevertheless, the 
Court’s ruling in Mistretta allowed the Commission to continue to promulgate 
binding Sentencing Guidelines until the Supreme Court addressed the 
constitutionality of the Guidelines themselves in United States v. Booker over 
 
 7. Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the 
Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 20 (2003). 
 8. See Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Limits of Federal Criminal Sentencing Policy; Or, 
Confessions of Two Reformed Reformers, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1001, 1006 (2001). 
 9. Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 7, at 25. 
 10. See David E. Patton, Guns, Crime Control, and a Systemic Approach to Federal Sentencing, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1427, 1465–66 (2011). 
 11. Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 7, at 20 n.4. 
 12. Parker & Block, supra note 8, at 1011. 
 13. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1987). 
 14. Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 7, at 22–23. 
 15. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989). 
 16. Id. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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twenty-five years later.17 
By the time Booker was decided in 2005, the nation was already feeling the 
impact of the SRA and the mandatory Guidelines. Between 1980 and 2010, the 
federal prison population in the United States had increased at a rate of 222%, 
which the National Research Council attributed “entirely to changes in 
sentencing policy.”18 Several federal judges resigned from the bench in protest of 
the harsh and inflexible nature of the Guidelines, with one judge saying he “just 
[couldn’t], in good conscience, continue to do this.”19 Further, the Commission 
ignored Congress’s suggestion “that nonviolent, first-time offenders . . . ordinarily 
receive non-prison sentences.”20 This policy choice reduced the percentage of 
offenders sentenced to probation to just 7.1%, a decline from 37% in 1985.21 
For the first time in its post-SRA jurisprudence, the Supreme Court held in 
Booker that the Guidelines’ consistent application of sentences above the statutory 
maximums without the factual findings of a jury violated defendants’ right to a 
jury trial as enshrined in the Sixth Amendment.22 Additionally, the Court found 
that, while the provision of the SRA that made the Guidelines mandatory was 
unconstitutional, it was not appropriate to strike down the entire Act.23 As a 
result, the Court held that the Guidelines would now be advisory for federal 
judges—“requir[ing] a sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges, but . . . 
permit[ting] the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as 
well.”24 This shift from binding law to a guideline in the truest sense of the word 
made the Guidelines and recommendations of the Commission truly voluntary. 
However, studies that have tracked the use of the Guidelines in sentencing since 
the Booker decision have shown that more often than not, federal judges stick 
closely to the ranges recommended by the Guidelines.25 
III.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
It was against this tension that the interpretation issue arose in Eaden. Police 
officers properly obtained and executed a search warrant on Eaden’s home after 
previously making an undercover purchase of a substance they identified to be 
crack cocaine.26 In addition to finding 5.5 grams of crack cocaine inside the home, 
officers found nineteen rounds of ammunition that were “easily accessible and 
stored in close proximity to” the drugs.27 However, despite finding ammunition, 
 
 17. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005). 
 18. Marc Mauer, Long-Term Sentences: Time to Reconsider the Scale of Punishment, 87 UMKC L. 
REV. 113, 113, 120 (2018). 
 19. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 92 (rev. ed. 2012). 
 20. Mauer, supra note 18, at 121. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244. 
 23. Id. at 248–49. 
 24. Id. at 245 (citations omitted). 
 25. Patrick Schepens, Note, Solomon’s Choice: Severing the Mandatory Requirement of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines to Save a System Congress Never Intended, 26 MISS. C.L. REV. 375, 420 (2007). 
 26. United States v. Eaden, 914 F.3d 1004, 1006 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 27. Id. 
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no gun was found on Eaden or anywhere else in the home, and there was no other 
indication that the ammunition was in any way connected to the drugs.28 Eaden 
claimed that he had found the ammunition in a dumpster and brought it home, 
and the court noted that “[t]he record . . . [did] not indicate that the ammunition 
was in plain sight during the controlled purchase.”29 Because Eaden had been 
previously convicted for a state drug felony offense, he “was charged in federal 
court with possession of ammunition as a felon,” to which he pleaded guilty.30 
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a probation officer “must 
conduct a presentence investigation and submit a report to the court before it 
imposes sentence.”31 This Presentence Report (PSR) is required to “calculate the 
defendant’s offense level and criminal history category” and is also required to 
“identify all applicable guidelines and policy statements of the Sentencing 
Commission.”32 Eaden’s PSR identified “a base offense level of fourteen” as a 
result of his prior felony conviction and a four-level enhancement due to his 
possession of ammunition “in connection with another felony offense.”33 The 
PSR calculated this enhancement based off of the Guidelines, which recommend 
a four-level enhancement “if the defendant . . . used or possessed any firearm or 
ammunition in connection with another felony offense.”34 
During the course of the statutorily-mandated objection period,35 Eaden 
objected to the report’s recommendation of the firearm enhancement, arguing 
that his possession of ammunition alone without the presence of a firearm could 
not, for the purposes of the PSR, be construed to have facilitated his drug 
trafficking offense.36 The PSR recommended a four-level sentencing enhancement 
despite Eaden’s objections, noting the lack of Fifth Circuit precedent, the plain 
text of the Guideline’s “application note,” and a relatively recent decision in the 
Sixth Circuit that upheld an enhancement in a similar situation when 
ammunition, but not a firearm, was present.37 In United States v. Coleman, the 
Sixth Circuit found that ammunition alone was enough to trigger the sentencing 
enhancement through the “fortress theory,” which states that “a connection 
[between the firearm and the crime] is established if it reasonably appears that the 
firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant . . . are to be 
used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction.”38 In applying 
this “fortress theory,” the PSR in Eaden’s case stated that “because the 
ammunition ‘potentially emboldened Eaden in the knowledge that he was one 
step closer to having a fully-loaded firearm to protect . . . his illegal drugs, . . .’ the 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)(A). 
 32. Id. 32(d)(1)(A)-(B). 
 33. Eaden, 914 F.3d at 1006. 
 34. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 35. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(f)(1). 
 36. Eaden, 914 F.3d at 1006. 
 37. Id.; United States v. Coleman, 627 F.3d 205, 214 (2010). 
 38. Coleman, 627 F.3d at 212 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 510 F.3d 622, 626 (6th Cir. 
2007)). 
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possession alone was connected with the drug trafficking offense.”39 Over Eaden’s 
objections at the subsequent sentencing hearing, the judge accepted the PSR’s 
recommendation of the four-level sentencing enhancement, finding that the 
evidence showed that his “possession of the ammunition facilitated or had the 
potential to facilitate his drug trafficking crime offense.”40 It was this application 
of the Guidelines, specifically § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), that Eaden appealed to the Fifth 
Circuit.41 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit considered two related questions, both issues of 
first impression, that would determine whether Eaden’s possession of 
ammunition by itself was enough to trigger a four-level sentencing enhancement 
under the Guidelines.42 First, the court determined that ammunition alone could 
sometimes facilitate drug trafficking for purposes of the enhancement under the 
Guidelines, but only “under appropriate circumstances not present in this case.”43 
Analyzing the plain text of the Guideline itself, which states that the enhancement 
applies “if the defendant . . . used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in 
connection with another felony offense,”44 the court determined that the use of 
the word “or” plainly indicated that the Commission contemplated that there 
would be instances when ammunition alone would be enough to apply the 
enhancement.45 
The second question the court had to answer, however, was more fact-intensive 
and specific: “whether, as is true with a firearm, there is a presumption of 
facilitation when ammunition alone is present at the time of the drug trafficking 
offense.”46 Although the text of the Guideline clearly states that ammunition 
alone can sometimes facilitate a drug trafficking offense, the Fifth Circuit noted 
that this falls short of an outright presumption and chose to consult the 
Guideline’s application note for further clarification.47 The application notes to 
the Guidelines “generally bind federal courts unless they are inconsistent with the 
text of the Guideline.”48 Thus, a court’s interpretation of a Guideline’s 
application note has the same bearing on a defendant’s sentence as a court’s 
interpretation of the Guideline itself. The application note that applied to the 
section at issue in this case, however, very clearly did not mention ammunition at 
all.49 The note only contemplates a situation in which a “firearm is found in close 
proximity to drugs”;50 only then can the facilitation of a drug offense be presumed. 
 
 39. Eaden, 914 F.3d at 1006. 
 40. Id. at 1007. 
 41. Id. at 1005. 
 42. Id. at 1007. 
 43. Id. 
 44. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) 
(emphasis added). 
 45. Eaden, 914 F.3d at 1008. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. United States v. Ochoa-Gomez, 777 F.3d 278, 282 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. 
Garcia-Rodriguez, 415 F.3d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 610 (5th 
Cir. 2002)). 
 49. Eaden, 914 F.3d at 1008 (citing § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(B)). 
 50. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(B). 
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The court found that, because the application note was “addressed specifically 
to the drug trafficking context” and only mentioned firearms without reference 
to ammunition alone, a presumption of facilitation could not be extended to a 
situation like Eaden’s.51 Because there was no presumption, the court held that 
the government was obligated to affirmatively show that “the possession of 
ammunition facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the other offense.”52 This 
showing could be made by proving that the ammunition was in plain sight or was 
brandished during the commission of the underlying drug trafficking felony.53 
Applying this to the facts of the case, the court found that there was no evidence 
that the ammunition was in plain sight; in fact, the underlying record indicated 
that the ammunition was merely “stored in close proximity to the illegal drugs.”54 
As a result, the court held that the four-level sentence enhancement 
recommended by the PSR and applied by the district court judge was improper 
and remanded the case for resentencing.55 
In finding the enhancement to be improper, the court noted its split with the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Coleman, where the Sixth Circuit found that the 
presumption of facilitation was proper when ammunition alone was present at 
the scene of a drug crime.56 Using traditional canons of construction, the Sixth 
Circuit first interpreted the plain meaning of the Guideline and its application 
note and found that by using the word “facilitate,” which means “ to make easier 
or less difficult,” the Guideline encompassed a situation in which ammunition 
alone was present at the scene of a drug crime. 57 The court reasoned that storing 
the ammunition in close proximity to the drugs “reduced or had the potential to 
reduce the difficulty of completing the felony drug trafficking.”58 The court 
rejected the defendant’s argument that the presence of ammunition alone did not 
increase the likelihood of violence during a drug transaction, stating that even 
getting “one step closer to having a loaded firearm” was enough to trigger the 
presumption in the application note.59 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Fifth Circuit took the correct approach in splitting with prior circuit court 
precedent and rejecting the sentencing enhancement for Eaden. By applying the 
enhancement narrowly, the court stayed true to the original intent of the 
Guideline—to punish crimes of violence in connection with drug trafficking60—
 
 51. Eaden, 914 F.3d at 1008. 
 52. Id. at 1009 (citing United States v. Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690, 692, 694–95, 694 n.9 (5th Cir. 
2009)). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1010. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id.; United States v. Coleman, 627 F.3d 205, 213 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 57. Coleman, 627 F.3d at 212. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 213. 
 60. See, e.g., United States v. McDonald, 165 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[Section 
2K2.1(b)] is a sentencing enhancement provision that was created in response to a concern about the 
increased risk of violence when firearms are used or possessed during the commission of another 
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while ensuring that an arbitrary application of a significant sentencing 
enhancement did not further contribute to the epidemic of mass incarceration in 
this country. First, the court correctly held that the plain language of the 
Guideline, coupled with its application note, precluded a finding that Eaden’s 
possession of ammunition alone facilitated his drug trafficking offense.61 While 
the Guideline itself does mention ammunition, the application note clarifies 
when a presumption can be broadly applied and only mentions firearms.62 
Without more clarity, it would be irresponsible to extend the presumption, as the 
Sixth Circuit did, to all instances in which ammunition is found without a 
firearm. This extension would subject defendants to increasingly harsher 
punishments for the sole reason that, in the words of the Sixth Circuit, they were 
“one step closer” to having a gun.63 “One step closer,” however, should not be 
enough to deprive someone of their liberty—it is impossible to know, without 
further fact-finding, whether someone will continue to take the remaining steps. 
Second, the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Eaden was correct because applying a 
blanket presumption of facilitation to drug trafficking crimes where only 
ammunition is found would lead to absurd results that could not possibly have 
been contemplated by the drafters of the Guidelines. While the Fifth Circuit did 
note that in some circumstances ammunition can facilitate a crime, it was correct 
in concluding that a presumption would go too far.64 If a presumption were to be 
applied, possessing even one bullet would be enough to trigger the sentencing 
enhancement under the language of the Guidelines. This is clearly contrary to the 
intent of the enhancement—to punish violence in connection with drug crimes.65 
As the dissent in Coleman correctly noted, the “possession of nothing but bullets” 
and even the display of bullets does not cause immediate harm.66 A person needs 
something more—indeed, they must go “one step” further—for the ammunition to 
make a difference in the commission of a crime. And as the Fifth Circuit correctly 
noted, that is a determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis, not as a 
blanket presumption.67 
Finally, any interpretation of the Guidelines must be looked at through the 
lens of our country’s current mass incarceration epidemic. As noted previously, 
the strict nature of the Guidelines, and the frequency with which they are applied 
by federal judges, has led to an increase in the U.S. prison population and the 
length of the average federal prison sentence.68 As the conversation around 
sentencing reform increasingly leads to action at the federal level,69 it is important 
 
felony.”). 
 61. See Eaden, 914 F.3d at 1010. 
 62. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 63. Coleman, 627 F.3d at 213. 
 64. See Eaden, 914 F.3d at 1007–08. 
 65. See, e.g., McDonald, 165 F.3d at 1037. 
 66. Coleman, 627 F.3d at 216 (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
 67. Eaden, 914 F.3d at 1008. 
 68. Shon Hopwood, The Effort to Reform the Federal Criminal Justice System, 128 YALE L.J.F. 791, 
793 (2019). 
 69. See, e.g., Nicholas Fandos, Senate Passes Bipartisan Criminal Justice Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/senate-criminal-justice-bill.html 
[https://perma.cc/7SWY-9A6N]. 
COPYRIGHT © 2020 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
250 SMU LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 73:243 
that federal judges at the front lines of sentencing avoid contributing to the 
problem by narrowly interpreting the Guidelines where possible and applying 
them only where the situation warrants. In Eaden’s case, the four-level sentencing 
enhancement would have almost doubled his original sentence solely because he 
possessed something which had the vague potential to cause harm—but only if he 
acquired an actual firearm. 
While the concerns addressed by the Guidelines are important, it is equally 
important to ensure that the Guidelines are applied fairly and not arbitrarily in 
the face of ambiguity. By construing the Guideline narrowly and staying true to 
the plain language of the Guideline and its application note, the Fifth Circuit 
avoided handing down an inequitable and unfair punishment that would only 
contribute to the overly long prison sentences that federal inmates often receive. 
Other courts confronting this question should follow this example and ensure 
that defendants are punished for crimes they actually do commit—not for coming 
“one step closer” to a crime they might commit. 
